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Emotions are complex phenomena. They modulate and 
guide behavior as a collection of biological, social, and 
cognitive components. Theoretical assumptions emphasize 
one or more components, thus we can distinguish between 
cognitive theories (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2008), social-
constructivist theories (Averill, 1980; Bodor, 2004; Harre, 
1986), and biological theories (Darwin, 1872/1963). Other 
authors, however, suggest an integrative view of emotions 
(Buck, 1985; Nábrády, 2006; Strongman, 2003). In this pa-
per, we follow the biologically based theories and the cog-
nitive/affective neuroscience approach. The aim of this pa-
per is to give an overview of the historical roots, methods, 
and current research trends in the cognitive neuroscience 
of emotions. We present some human experimental data in 
order to demonstrate the relevance of using brain imaging 
techniques in the field of emotion. Before going into details 
with methodological issues and current research trends, we 
first illustrate some historical aspects of emotions.
Emotions, feelings, and affects are subjective states, 
thus it is not an easy task to quantify and examine them with 
objective methods. For this reason, research on emotion has 
largely been a neglected field in psychology. However, more 
and more interest has been dedicated to emotions for the last 
30 years. 
In the history of psychology, the first “revolution of emo-
tion” started in the 1960s when affective phenomena were 
implemented into a cognitive framework. Magda Arnold’s 
(1960) concept of appraisal meant that we immediately and 
automatically evaluate anything that we encounter. This 
leads us to approach anything that we appraise as “good”, to 
avoid what we find “bad”, and ignore what is indifferent or 
“neutral”. Appraisal is connected to perception and induces 
action. Schachter and Singer (1962) have suggested a two-
factor theory of emotion in which emotions are interpreted 
as the interaction of physiological arousal and cognitive ap-
praisal. According to others like Lazarus (1982, 1984), we 
are “evaluators” performing cognitive activity. We evaluate 
each stimulus that we encounter with respect to its person-
al relevance and significance. In sum, this first revolution 
has focused attention on the cognitive aspects of emotion 
(Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). 
The second revolution occurred in the 1990s (Dama-
sio, 1994/1996; Davidson, 1995; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 
1998) and has introduced new possibilities such as using 
brain imaging techniques in the cognitive sciences and in 
the research of emotions as well. New methods and equip-
ment (e.g., ERP, fMRI, PET) are also suitable tools for 
studying emotions. Studies on the neural basis of emotions 
have been integrated into the discipline of cognitive neuro-
science, and from the increasing number of publications we 
can conclude that the cognitive neuroscience of emotions is 
an emerging field.
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Cognitive neuroscience of emotions is a rapidly growing field. It focuses on the neural basis of emotional and 
social processes and strongly contributes to the better understanding of the biological basis of emotional processing. 
It integrates the results of neural and behavioral levels of analysis in healthy and clinical populations as well. The 
main topics and questions in cognitive neuroscience of emotions are the role of emotions in information process-
ing, their neural basis for both cortical and sub-cortical levels, the perception of arousing and neutral stimuli, emo-
tions and memory, the role of emotion in decision making, detecting emotional versus neutral faces, and individual 
differences in emotionality and their biological background. Brain imaging techniques (e.g., functional magnetic 
resonance imaging–fMRI) are used both for examining functional connections between emotion and perception, at-
tention, memory and decision making, and for localizing specific psychological functions to specific brain areas. In 
this paper we discuss not only current research trends and methods but some important brain areas responsible for 
emotions (e.g., amygdala, anterior cingular cortex, prefrontal cortex) as well. 
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The next section presents a brief history from the early 
neuroanatomical models to the birth of affective neurosci-
ence. Afterwards, we examine the various techniques in the 
field of cognitive neuroscience. Finally, we will describe 
some current research trends with respect to human experi-
mental results which highlight important brain areas that are 
responsible for emotions.
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW FROM EARLY 
NEUROANATOMICAL MODELS TO MODERN 
NEUROSCIENCE
The roots of affective neuroscience go back to the early 
neuroanatomical models. Data came from introspection of 
healthy subjects and observation of patients with lesions or 
animal studies.
One of the earliest and most influential theories is that 
of William James (1884). According to his peripheralist 
theory, emotion is defined as the perception of specific bod-
ily changes which result automatically from the appropriate 
stimuli. Imagine that you are walking in the forest and sud-
denly you notice a wolf. James states that, rather than your 
heart starts to pound because you feel afraid, you feel afraid 
because your heart is pounding. A more modern and modi-
fied peripheralist view is represented by Antonio Damasio. 
In his somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994/1996), he 
assumes that emotional stimuli elicit bodily changes (“so-
matic markers”) whose central representation contributes to 
decision making. 
James’s theory has been challenged by many critics. In 
the first half of the 20th century, the results of Bard’s (1934) 
and Cannon’s (1931) studies with animals have demonstrat-
ed that rage reactions in cats are disrupted by brain lesions 
within the hypothalamus. If the hypothalamus is spared, 
however, rage reactions are still elicited even when the cer-
ebral cortex is removed. On the basis of these observations, 
a centralist theory has been proposed in which the thalamus 
is a centrum for emotional perception and the hypothala-
mus mediates the emotional expressions (Morris & Dolan, 
2004). 
In his alternative assumption, Papez (1937) has de-
scribed not one single center for emotions (such as the thala-
mus or the hypothalamus) but a neural circuit within several 
brain structures. The Papez circuit consists of the thalamus, 
the hypothalamus, the mamillary bodies, the cingular gyrus, 
and the hippocampus (Dalgleish, 2004). He has also sug-
gested pathways among these structures where information 
is transmitted during an emotional state. However, there is 
less evidence that all streams are central to emotion. His 
work is a remarkable achievement for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand, it is an analogy for recent network models. 
On the other hand, he was among the first who have em-
phasized functional connections between cortical and sub-
cortical structures. Papez was also a forerunner for current 
cognitive theories of emotion in the sense that emotional 
states have connections with higher cognitive processes, but 
the term “cognitive appraisal” has never been mentioned in 
his work. 
The limbic system has often been mentioned as the cen-
tral region for emotions. Its name comes from the Latin 
word “limbus” which means “border”. The limbic system 
was first mentioned in 1878 by Paul Broca who described 
the gyrus around the brainstem. The limbic system consists 
of the Papez circuit extended with the septal areas, the nu-
cleus accumbens, the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Greenstein & Greenstein, 2000).
The cognitive neuroscience of emotions and/or affective 
neuroscience
The concept was first used by Jaak Panksepp (1998) as 
“affective neuroscience”. The cognitive neuroscience of 
emotions concerns the neural basis of emotional and social 
processes in humans and animals. It integrates molecular, 
neural, and behavioral levels of analysis in healthy and clini-
cal populations as well (Davidson & Sutton, 1995; Lane & 
Nadel, 2000; LeDoux, 2000; Panksepp, 1998; Schmidt, 
2003). It deals with the following topics: the role of emotions 
in information processing, their neural basis for both cortical 
and sub-cortical levels, the perception of arousing stimuli, 
emotions and memory, the role of emotion in decision mak-
ing, detecting emotional versus neutral faces, and individual 
differences in emotionality and their biological background. 
We will discuss these topics in the fourth section.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN  
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
In the 19th century, the first mapping of brain functions 
was proposed by the phrenologist Franz Joseph Gall. He be-
lieved that the amount of brain tissue devoted to a cognitive 
function determined its influence on behavior. He assumed 
that increases in brain size would translate into measurable 
bumps on the skull. Many scientists began to dispute the va-
lidity of the phrenologists’ theory and methodology. Conse-
quently, mapping the brain through bumps on the skull had 
collapsed by the 1830s (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2004).
In contrast to Gall’s doubtful methodology, recent brain 
imaging techniques use a reasonable theoretical framework 
to describe changes in the blood-flow and metabolism of dif-
ferent neural activities during perceptual, motor, and cogni-
tive mechanisms. Other methods examine electric and mag-
netic correlates of neural processes (Kéri & Gulyás, 2003). 
Localization and networks
Functional brain imaging techniques were first used in 
order to localize sensory, motor, and cognitive processes. 
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Localization studies are important because psychologi-
cal functions could be associated with specific brain areas. 
They not only provide information about the pathways of 
information processing in a normal population (i.e., about 
brain structures which are responsible for a specific function 
and about the temporal features of this function), but also 
provide information about impairments of a specific brain 
region and deficits in psychological functions. Functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies not only gen-
erate maps of brain functions, but also identify functional 
relations among brain regions (Berman, Jonides, & Nee, 
2006; Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2004).
Techniques and methods
Cognitive neuroscience offers methods for examination 
of one single neuron, as well as of the activity of neuron 
populations in vivo. The relevance of these techniques for 
research on emotions is that they provide “on-line” infor-
mation from the functioning brain, detect fast changes and 
localize functions to specific brain structures.
Functional brain imaging techniques are fMRI and posi-
tron emission topography (PET). Although magnetoenceph-
alography (MEG), electroencephalography (EEG), event-
related potentials (ERP), and brain electric activity mapping 
(BEAM) are indirect imaging techniques, they are common 
in functional localization (see Table 1).
Different brain imaging methods are usually compared 
and contrasted in terms of their spatial and temporal reso-
lution. In general, electrophysiological methods based on 
direct mapping of brain electrical dipoles (e.g., EEG) or 
magnetic dipoles (MEG) define the underlying cortical neu-
ronal events in real time (10-100 ms), but provide relatively 
poor spatial resolution (many mm-cm). In contrast, fMRI 
and PET provide information on the increases in blood flow 
accompanying neuronal activity with relatively high spatial 
resolution (1-10 mm), but have limited temporal resolution 
because hemodynamic changes accompanying neuronal de-
polarization are much slower (Matthews, 2001). 
Optical imaging methods (e.g., near infrared spectros-
copy or NIRS) measure changes in cortical blood flow. They 
have poor spatial resolution and are restricted to study of 
cortical surface. In contrast, PET and fMRI allow mapping 
of neuronal activation deep in the brain. Metabolic imag-
ing by magnetic resonance spectroscopic imaging (MRSI) 
or PET is also possible, but these methods have generally 
lower spatial resolution and poor temporal resolution (30s–
minute). However, the specificity of the information they 
can provide is high (Matthews, 2001). 
In sum, functional brain imaging can tell “what” and 
“where” something happens in the brain, while electro-
physiological methods provide a better answer for “when” 
something happens. A combination of methods allows us to 
improve scientific knowledge of brain function. 
CURRENT TRENDS IN  
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMOTIONS
As it was stated in the introduction, the cognitive neu-
roscience of emotions deals with the role of emotions dur-
ing cognitive processes (e.g., perception, attention, memory, 
decision making), its neural basis in the cortical and sub-
cortical levels, the perception of emotional stimuli, and the 
individual differences in responding to emotionally evoca-
tive stimuli. In the following section, we discuss current re-
search trends and describe some brain structures responsible 
for emotions (see Figure 1). 
Relevant brain structures responsible for emotions
Amygdala. The amygdala plays a key role in emotional 
life. It is an almond-shaped structure situated bilaterally in 
the medial temporal lobe. Studies using modern brain imag-
ing techniques have pointed out that the amygdala plays a 
role in emotional conditioning, in storing emotional events, 
and in coding emotional signals, especially the facial ex-
pression of fear (LeDoux, 1996). 
Table 1
Techniques of localizing brain functions
Lesion Stimulation Registration of brain functions
Invasive Non-invasive
– neurological disposition (corpus 
callosum agenesia)
– disease (tumor, brain hemor-
rhage, sclerosis multiplex)
– brain injury (accident)
– surgical intervention (frontal 
lobotomy)
– observations during epilepsy
– direct electrical stimulation dur-
ing surgery
– transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS)




– optical intrinsic signal imaging 
(OIS)
– electric: EEG, ERP, BEAM
– magnetic: MEG
– functional: PET, fMRI
– near infrared spectroscopy 
(NIRS)
Note. Adapted from Gulyás, 2003; Toga & Mazziotta, 2002. EEG = electroencephalography; ERP = event-related potentials; BEAM = brain electric activ-
ity mapping; MEG = magnetoencephalography; PET = positron emission topography; fMRI = functional magnetic resonance imaging.
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Several researchers disagree with the fear-specific func-
tion of the amygdala and suggest that it plays an expanded 
role in emotional detection. Breiter and colleagues (1996) 
have assumed that the amygdala might have an expanded 
role besides identifying fearful stimuli. They assume that 
the amygdala is sensitive to detection of pleasantness/un-
pleasantness (valence) of stimuli in addition to features spe-
cific to emotional states such as fear, disgust, sadness, and 
surprise. This has been an inspiring idea, and a new bidi-
mensional model has emerged from it. According to this bi-
dimensional model, scientists dispute whether the amygdala 
is sensitive for pleasantness or unpleasantness of a stimu-
lus (valence-sensitivity) or if the amygdala responds to the 
arousal evoked by a stimulus. 
Paul Whalen and his colleagues (2001) have tested the 
“valence hypothesis” in an fMRI experiment. In this experi-
ment, participants viewed fearful, angry, and neutral faces. 
Brain activity in the “fear vs. neutral”, the “anger vs. neu-
tral”, and the “fear vs. anger” condition were compared. 
Previously, Whalen hypothesized that an angry face shows 
more information about the source of threat, while a fearful 
face mirrors more ambiguity regarding the direction of dan-
ger. Consequently, Whalen expected more amygdala activ-
ity during the detection of anger compared to the detection 
of fear. In the “fearful vs. neutral” and the “angry vs. neu-
tral” conditions, that is, during perception of stimuli with 
negative valence, ventral amygdala became more active. In 
the “fearful vs. angry” condition, the dorsal amygdala was 
activated. More recent studies (Ewbank, Barnard, Croucher, 
Ramponi, & Calder, 2009), however, have pointed out that 
the amygdala can also be activated when the arousal level is 
low (e.g., sadness). This is a turning point in research relat-
ed to the amygdala, because its role is becoming associated 
with the perception of those stimuli that are relevant for the 
organism (Sander, 2009).
FMRI results from our lab have strengthened this as-
sumption, too (Hermann, Deak, Papp, Révész, & Bereczkei, 
2010). Twenty healthy subjects were presented emotional-
ly evocative and neutral pictures. Inside the scanner, they 
had to rate the subjective level of pleasantness on a 9-point 
Likert scale. Brain activation to self-relevant stimuli (posi-
tive, negative, and social neutral) was compared to neural 
response to self-irrelevant neutral pictures (e.g., household 
objects). Irrespectively of the pleasantness and arousal rat-
ings, amygdala activation was found (see Figure 2). This 
means the amygdala responded to positive, negative, and 
neutral but socially relevant stimuli when subjects had to 
give assessment for the stimuli. Hereby, we do not suggest 
that the amygdala would be the only brain structure for rat-
ing the relevance of a stimulus. Other brain regions, like the 
insula, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate 
gyrus also play a crucial role. 
Figure 1. Brain structures responsible for emotions.








Figure 2. Brain activation to emotionally relevant stimuli com-
pared to irrelevant neutral pictures: the amygdala (24-2-24; T = 
7.17, p < 0.05, FWE) responded to negative, positive, and socially 
relevant stimuli (neutral faces) compared to non-social neutral pic-
tures (e.g., household objects). 
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In sum, recent brain imaging techniques have helped to 
clarify the role of the amygdala in emotion detection, and 
that its function is non-specific to fear, but might be sen-
sitive to the arousal of the relevance of the stimulus. The 
amygdala might influence cognition by modulating sensory 
thresholds that regulate both information processing and 
guiding the organism’s attention to the emotionally relevant 
stimuli.
Insula. The insula is a multimodal sensory region in 
Brodmann areas 13 and 14. Its activation can be detected 
during emotional induction when an emotional event is re-
called or imagined (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). 
It also coordinates sensomotor responses to unpredictable, 
threatening stimuli (Szily & Kéri, 2008) and to cognitive 
tasks (Reiman et al., 1997). The insula not only plays a role 
in the identification of special types of emotions such as 
disgust from faces and the perception of unpleasant tastes 
(Stark et al., 2007), but Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, 
and Dolan (2004) have argued that the insula also mediates 
emotions to reach the level of consciousness through arous-
al. Others, like Reiman et al. (1997), have assumed that the 
insula plays a signaling role which alarms the organism dur-
ing a state of threat. This assumption can explain why both 
self-induced and recalled guilt, shame, sadness, and also un-
pleasant stimuli activate the insula (Lane, Reiman, Ahern, 
Schwartz, & Davidson, 1997; Lane, Reiman, Bradley, et al., 
1997).
Anterior cingular cortex. The cingulate gyrus belongs to 
the limbic system. Functionally it can be divided into two 
parts: its dorsal subdivision associated with cognition in the 
Brodmann areas 24 and 32 (the cingulate motor area), and 
its ventral subdivision associated with affective processes in 
the Brodmann areas 25, 32, and 33. Its rich anatomical con-
nectivity provides a neural background to evaluate the be-
havioral relevance of stimuli and the influence of autonomic 
and motor responses (Morris & Dolan, 2004). 
According to Bush, Luu, and Posner’s study (2000), the 
anterior cingular cortex plays a key role in emotional moni-
toring and evaluation. It integrates autonomic, emotional, 
and attentional information in order to regulate the emotion-
al states with respect to the ongoing emotional or cognitive 
priorities and goals and to select appropriate responses. In 
the case of a conflict between ongoing and adequate activity, 
the anterior cingular cortex can alarm the prefrontal cortex 
to modify the ongoing behavior. 
Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, and Dolan (1999) have dem-
onstrated the function of the anterior cingular cortex in their 
PET study. With computer graphical manipulations they 
produced a range of six intensity levels of an individual face 
depicting an emotional facial expression (e.g., fear) and a 
neutral face. On this intensity range, a neutral face was seen 
on one end (100% neutral face, 0% emotional face), an emo-
tional face on the other (e.g., 100% sad face, 0% neutral). 
Pictures were presented one-by-one to participants while 
recording their brain activation. The intensity of the emo-
tional expression correlated with a neural response in the 
anterior cingular cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex – that 
is, the higher the level of expressed intensity on a face, the 
stronger the reaction elicited in the anterior cingular cortex. 
Orbitofrontal cortex. The cortex on the ventral (orbital) 
surface of the frontal lobe is highly developed in primates 
and is comprised of Brodmann areas 11, 12, 13, and 14. It 
consists of Brodmann areas 10, 11, and 47 in humans. The 
anatomical connectivity gives it the potential to integrate 
sensory information from different sources, to modulate 
sensory and other cognitive processing via feedback con-
nections, and to influence motor and autonomic output re-
sponses (Morris & Dolan, 2004). 
In an fMRI study (Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000) sub-
jects received either reward or punishment in a card game. 
Different brain structures were found to be active for reward 
compared to punishment. The orbitofrontal cortex, howev-
er, has shown valence-independent activity. It has respond-
ed to both high amounts of reward and high amounts of 
punishment. One possible explanation (Rolls, 1999, 2000a, 
2004) suggests that the orbitofrontal cortex is responsible 
for learning the emotional and motivational value of stimuli. 
In regard to frontal brain areas, a lateralization hypoth-
esis is often cited (Davidson, 1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1998). It 
declares that left prefrontal regions might be connected to 
approaching behavior and maintaining goals, whereas right 
prefrontal areas might be associated with behavioral avoid-
ance and withdrawal. Interestingly, depressive people’s 
stronger negative emotions might be due to hypoactivity in 
the left prefrontal cortex (Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & 
Putnam, 2002). 
Individual differences in affective reactions: brain, 
behavior, and personality
Through behavioral, electrophysiological, and fMRI 
studies Peter Lang and Margaret Bradley have demonstrat-
ed the existence of two motivational systems – behavioral 
approach and behavioral avoidance (Bradley & Lang, 2007; 
Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). All emotional states can 
be described by two dimensions: valence and arousal. The 
valence dimension represents the pleasantness/unpleasant-
ness of a stimulus, while the arousal dimension shows the 
level of intensity. The patterns of emotional states evoked 
by emotionally arousing sounds, pictures, and texts have the 
same boomerang-shape in a two-dimensional space. In the 
two-dimensional space, pleasant stimuli are located in the 
upper half, unpleasant stimuli are in the bottom, while neu-
tral stimuli can be found at the left side. Neutral stimuli have 
low ratings in arousal and medium ratings on the pleasure 
scale. 
The boomerang-shape distribution seems to be uni-
versal. In some cross-cultural studies, we compared the 
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North-American standards to Hungarian, Polish, Flemish, 
and Brazilian data (Deak, Csenki, & Révész, 2010; Várh-
egyi, 2010). The ratings and distribution were similar in the 
Hungarian sample as well (see Figure 3). We can conclude 
that IAPS stimulus sets and rating procedures are suitable 
for measuring human emotional reactions and for searching 
for specific response patterns among individuals or clinical 
populations.
Many terminologies exist for bidirectional descriptions 
of behavior (Corr, 2002; Gray, 1994; Lang et al., 1990). 
Gray (1994) has differentiated a behavioral activation sys-
tem (BAS) and a behavioral inhibitory system (BIS). Rolls 
(2000b) has categorized behavioral responses into two 
groups: responses to rewarding (positive) stimuli and to 
punishing (negative) stimuli. Considering this, we may ask 
if there are patterns of individual differences within these 
two systems (approach/activation vs. avoidance/inhibition). 
Examining individual differences in emotional reactiv-
ity is based on the fact that an emotional stimulus can in-
duce a wide range of responses from the participants. When 
considering the question of individual differences, one must 
specify the response system in which scientific explora-
tion occurs. Besides individual differences in subjective 
evaluation, there can be differences in brain activity as well 
(Hamann & Canli, 2004). For example, an individual may 
have a low threshold for the elicitation of subjective feel-
ings (which can be measured by self-reports), but may also 
have a relatively high threshold for the elicitation of physi-
ological changes. Other parameters which differ across in-
dividuals can be the peak of emotional response, the rise 
time to peak, and the recovery time of expressive behavior 
(Davidson, 2000). 
Schaefer and colleagues (2002) asked their participants 
to regulate their reactions to negative pictures in order to 
maintain negative affective state for a while. Greater amyg-
dala activation was found among people who gave higher 
scores on the negative emotionality scale. 
Richard Davidson (1992b, 2000; Davidson & Irwin, 
1999) has used the phrase “affective style” to refer to the 
broad rubric of characteristics along which individuals 
might differ in their reactivity to emotionally provocative 
events. Large individual differences were found in baseline 
electro-physiological measures of prefrontal activation. 
These individual variations were associated with differ-
ences in affective reactivity. Extreme left-frontally activated 
subjects were compared to extreme right-frontally activated 
participants in an MRI study to determine if there were any 
morphological differences in anatomical structures. Results 
showed no regional volumetric asymmetry between the two 
groups. These findings suggest that the individual differenc-
es in the prefrontal brain activation were likely functional 
and not structural (Davidson, 2000). 
Extreme left- and extreme right-frontally activated sub-
jects showed significant differences in both self-reported 
positive and negative affects, and brain activation pattern. 
Left-frontally activated subjects reported more positive 
and less negative affects than their right-frontally activat-
ed counterparts (Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, & Doss, 
1992).
FMRI correlates of personality traits (e.g., extraversion 
and neuroticism) are also an interesting direction in the cog-
nitive neuroscience of emotions. In an experiment (Canli et 
al., 2001), participants had to passively view positive and 
negative pictures in the MR scanner. Results converged to 
previous behavioral studies: scores on extraversion corre-
lated with brain activation responding to positive stimuli, 
and not to negative stimuli. Moreover, neuroticism corre-
lated with brain activation in left temporal and frontal re-
gions in response to negative pictures. Canli’s further find-
ings showed that the amygdala of people with a higher score 
on extraversion became more active to happy faces (Canli, 
Sivers, Whitfield, Gotlib, & Gabrieli, 2002). 
In a recent fMRI study (Papp, Deak, Hermann, Révész, 
& Bereczkei, 2010), we tested J.A. Gray’s (1994) neuropsy-
chological theory of personality among healthy volunteers. 
Subjects were divided into sub-groups on the basis of their 
scores on behavioral activation system and behavioral in-
hibitory system. The behavioral activation system is respon-
sible for reward anticipation, goal-directed behavior, and 
Figure 3. Distribution of IAPS pictures in the affective space de-
termined by valence and arousal dimensions from all subjects in 
the Hungarian sample compared to the US ratings (adapted from 
Deak, Csenki, & Révész, 2010).
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approaching, while anxiety, inhibition, and avoidance de-
rive from the behavioral inhibitory system. High behavioral 
inhibitory system subjects’ brain activity was significantly 
stronger for negative stimuli compared to low behavioral 
inhibitory system subjects. It means that individual differ-
ences can modulate the emotional information processing. 
In our study the anterior cingular cortex, the orbitofrontal 
cortex, and parahippocampal areas were found to play an 
important role. 
SUMMARY
Emotion research has been a neglected field until the last 
30 years. Due to the emergence of cognitive neuroscience 
in the last 10 years, scientific inquiry about emotions has 
dramatically increased. Brain imaging techniques have pro-
vided new methods and experimental paradigms with which 
we can find specific brain structures and neural networks 
that generate and maintain emotional states, and take part 
in emotional processing. We can also get information about 
the relationship between emotion and cognitive processes 
(e.g., perception, attention, memory, and decision making), 
as well as the consequences of brain impairment on one’s 
social-emotional behavior. 
The cognitive neuroscience approach to emotions or the 
affective neuroscience with its strong biological identity 
can integrate all of the abovementioned questions and find 
answers to them with its special methods. Both the electro-
physiological methods (e.g., EEG, ERP) with high temporal 
resolution (msec) and the functional brain imaging methods 
with high spatial resolution provide details about “when”, 
“where”, and “what” happens in the brain during psycho-
logical processes. 
In light of this, it is also necessary to point out some 
of the disadvantages of the brain imaging methods. For ex-
ample, the scanning procedure in an fMRI study is loud. 
To reduce acoustic noise, fMRI participants should always 
wear ear-plugs or headphones. The most common risk when 
participating in an fMRI study is claustrophobia. If a sub-
ject appears to be more than mildly anxious, the experiment 
should be stopped immediately. Finally, the costs of an fMRI 
study are relatively high, therefore it is necessary to not only 
construct an efficient experiment, but also to use previously 
collected behavioral data from pilot studies to increase the 
likelihood of experimental success and save money. 
In this paper, we have summarized not only the defini-
tion and methods of affective neuroscience, but also its cur-
rent research trends. One prominent field is emotional in-
formation processing. Many researches focus either on face 
perception, since facial expressions are important sources 
of information about the internal state of the organism (e.g., 
joy, disgust, being alert or relaxed), or to the perception of 
emotionally evocative stimuli as they indicate information 
about the external features of the environment (e.g., direc-
tion of threat, emotional atmosphere in a social context). 
This trend mainly follows a categorical approach in which 
discrete emotional categories are defined (e.g., anger, sad-
ness, fear, happiness). 
Another trend follows a dimensional approach. In this 
frame, there are generally two dimensions (valence and 
arousal), and emotional states are identified as “coordi-
nates” in the two-dimensional space. The key question for 
this research trend is whether valence or arousal is more 
prominent in the appraisal of emotional stimuli, and which 
are the common and different brain structures that respond 
to valence and arousal components.
Regarding the future of affective neuroscience, we have 
positive expectations. Many questions are still open. Much 
less is known about positive emotions than about negative 
emotions. More studies should be done about the neural 
background of the subjective component of emotions (feel-
ings). Moreover, an emerging field is the role of emotions 
in decision making. More data should be collected about 
the specific role of the brain structures. Recent studies have 
directed the attention to the role of cerebellum in cognitive 
and affective processes (Gordon, 2007; Schmahmann & 
Caplan, 2006; Schutter & Van Honk, 2005; Turner et al., 
2007). Finally, new methods, procedures, and experimental 
designs are expected to broaden the set of tools.
In this paper, we use the term affective neuroscience and 
the cognitive neuroscience of emotions as synonyms. Some 
may argue that emotions are not the topic of cognitive re-
search. Others (Lane & Nadel, 2000; LeDoux, 2000), how-
ever, disagree with using the term “affective neuroscience”. 
In their critiques, they argue that the neuronal language of 
cells in the nervous system is universal-that is, action po-
tentials are evoked similarly both in cognitive and affective 
processes. Thus, the term “affective neuroscience” leads to 
redundancy and a useless distinction between affective and 
cognitive neuroscience. We would like to emphasize, how-
ever, that it is neither the question of the relevance of the 
neuroscientific approach to emotions nor of the emotion’s 
role in information processing. But, this is a debate showing 
how a new approach is being integrated into the scientific 
discourse. It defines itself as affective neuroscience and/or 
the cognitive neuroscience of emotions. Instead of analyz-
ing the latest form of the classical cognition-emotion de-
bate, we would like to point out the fact that emotions are 
within the scope of scientific inquiry due to new methods 
offered by the neuroscientific approach.
In conclusion, we state that the affective neuroscience is 
a rapidly growing field that strongly contributes to the better 
understanding of the biological basis of emotional process-
ing. Brain imaging techniques are used both for examining 
functional connections between emotion and perception, at-
tention, memory, and decision making, and for localizing 
specific psychological functions at specific brain areas. 
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